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Abstract
This paper looks at the relationship between technological complexity and wages.  Using a panel
of UK establishments, we find that wages increase with the degree of complexity, measured both
by the task ratio and by the presence of integrated process controls.  Our findings are consistent
with Kremer's (1993) "O-Ring" production function, which implies strong complementarities
among the production activities.  The ability to implement performance appraisal systems has a
negative and significant effect on wages, consistent with the efficiency wage hypothesis.  The use
of minicomputers or the existence of a computer network increase the within-firm wage
dispersion, which is also consistent with the presence of complementarities in the production
process.
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11. Introduction
The last decades have witnessed important changes both in the production structure and in wage
dispersion, leading many observers to conclude that new technologies are closely related to rising
wage inequality.  The most prominent hypothesis is that the introduction of advanced
technologies has caused a strong increase in the demand for skilled workers 1.  Further, Kremer
and Maskin (1996) have suggested that technological change may have substantially contributed
to increasing segregation among workers of different quality into high-wage and low-wage firms.
Less attention has been paid to the relation between technological change and increasing within-
group wage inequality, or residual variation, mostly attributed to unobserved worker ability 2.
However, according to some recent results by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), individual
ability alone cannot entirely explain wage differentials: employer’s effects are found to be still
relevant.  The scope of this paper is to provide a theoretical and empirical analysis, at the firm-
level3, of the relation between complex technologies and wage-structure.  In particular, our
approach can explain why identical workers may receive different wages in equilibrium, and why
complex technologies may increase wage inequality among workers of different quality.
The first part of the paper develops a theoretical model where technology is represented
by the Kremer's (1993) “O-Ring” production function.  Production requires the execution of a
certain number of risky tasks.  The number of tasks is a measure of technological complexity
since, if even a single task is mis-performed, output is lost. This notion of technology implies the
existence of strong complementarities among the tasks, or activities, that constitute the production
process.  Similar ideas are put forward also by Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995), who argue that
the introduction of advanced technologies such as Computer-Aided Design or Computer-Aided
Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) systems has increased the degree of interdependence among the
productive activities of the firm.
We show that, when monitoring is imperfect, the employer will have an incentive to pay
wages that induce employees to elicit a proper level of effort.  The adoption of efficiency wages
in this context is peculiar to our model.  We also show that, when the degree of complexity in
production is relatively high, the employer will pay higher wages on average.  Furthermore, by
considering production processes where different tasks have a different sensitivity to effort, we
                                                          
1
  See, among many others, Berman et al. (1994), Autor et al. (1998), Doms et al. (1997), Goldin
and Katz (1998), and Haskel and Heden (1999).
2
  On within-group inequality, see for example Gottschalk (1997) and Acemoglu (1999).
3
  The labour-market implications of the basic theoretical model exploited here are explored in
Dalmazzo (2000).
2show that workers who possess the same ability can be paid different wages depending of the task
they are assigned to.  Thus, the present model is particularly useful to explain both between-firm
and within-firm wage inequality among identical workers 4.
The second part of the paper (Section 3) presents some cross-sectional evidence on the
relation between technology and wages drawn from WIRS 1990, a survey of British
establishments.  The aim of our empirical analysis is twofold. First, we seek to assess the impact
on wages of proxies for technological complexity, such as use of microprocessor technology,
R&D expenditure, and the proportion of complicated tasks.  Second, we try to evaluate the impact
on the wage structure of measures of inter-dependence in production activities, since the O-Ring
model is characterised by complementary tasks.
The results we obtain are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. On the
one hand, we show that firms that adopt relatively complex technologies pay high wages to each
category of worker considered (unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled, clerical, supervisor).  On the other
hand, we show that  – differently from most of the literature on computers and wages – not all
forms of microprocessor usage are related to higher wages.  However, consistently with the
notion of the O-Ring technology, we find that the use of integrated process control systems is
positively and significantly related to wages.  Our analysis has some obvious limits, since we
have no measure for the workforce ability.  For this reason, we cannot control for “sorting” of
high-quality workers into technologically-advanced firms, as the competitive model developed by
Kremer and Maskin (1996) suggests.  However, our empirical results are consistent with the
efficiency-wage hypothesis that forms the basis for our predictions. In fact, we find that the
ability to implement performance appraisal systems within the firm – which we interpret as a
proxy for the ability to monitor employees – has a negative and significant effect on wages.
The paper is composed as follows.  Section 2 develops the basic theoretical model, and
extends it to the endogenous choice of monitoring.  Section 3 presents the empirical results on the
relation between technology, wage levels, and within-firm wage dispersion.  Section 4 concludes.
2. The model
In the following section, we develop the basic model of the firm’s optimal behaviour when the
production function has the O-Ring form and workers can be imperfectly monitored.  In section
2.2, we extend the basic model to endogenise the choice of monitoring.  In section 2.3, we
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  On within-firm inequality, see Entorf et al. (1999) and the references quoted therein.
3examine the effects of product market competition by characterising a zero-profit equilibrium,
and obtain the main predictions of the theory.
2.1.  The basic framework.
In the model we develop, workers dislike effort and monitoring is imperfect.  As in the
efficiency-wage model by Summers (1988), we assume that the level of effort e exerted by a
worker is given by the following function:
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where w is the wage paid, x denotes the value of worker’s labour-market alternatives, and
)1,0(∈β .
For what concerns the firm’s technology, we borrow from Kremer (1993) the notion of
“O-Ring production function”.  Production requires that n tasks be correctly performed.  Here, the
probability that a task is carried out successfully depends on the effort put in by the worker who is
in charge of it.  Similarly to Kremer and Maskin (1996), production involves a number l of “easy”
tasks (l≤n), and (n-l) “hard” tasks.  We assume that easy and hard tasks have a different sensitivity
to effort.  In particular, an easy task will be performed correctly with probability equal to q=q(e),
with q' >0.  On the other hand, a hard tasks will be performed correctly with probability
qz=[q(e)]z, where z>1.  Thus, given the level of effort put in, a hard task is less likely to succeed
than an easy task.  Without loss of generality, we assume that each task is performed by a single
worker.
When:  (1) tasks have different difficulty, (2) all the workers assigned to hard tasks put in
the same level of effort, and (3) all the workers assigned to easy tasks put in the same level of
effort, then the O-Ring production function can be written as follows:
)();,( lnzl qqKflnBny −⋅⋅⋅⋅= α (2)
where K is the firm’s capital level, and αKflnB ⋅);,(  denotes the average per-worker’s revenue
when all the tasks are correctly performed, an event occurring with probability )( lnzl qq −⋅ .  The
4variable f denotes the number of identical firms in the industry, and we take Bf<0: the higher the
number of competing firms, the lower the firm’s revenues.  Note that the production function (2)
entails complementarity among tasks: as will be shown, the optimal wage to be paid for a certain
task depends on the wage levels paid for all the other tasks, be them easy or hard.  This property
follows directly from the technology considered: in the most extreme interpretation of Kremer
(1993), the degree of integration among tasks is such that, if only one task is mis-performed, the
value of production drops to zero.
Although not necessary for our main argument, it can be useful to think of the model as if
there were two types of workers:  high-skilled (indexed by h) and low-skilled (indexed by l),
assuming that workers of different skills cannot be substituted for one another 5.  Then, low-skill
workers will be assigned to easy tasks, while high-skill workers will be assigned to hard tasks.
For example, managerial tasks will be given only to workers who meet particular requirements in
terms of education, experience, etc.  When there are common preferences toward labour
disutility, equation (1) will hold for both types of workers, with xh and xl, denoting respectively
the high-skilled and the low-skilled labour-market opportunities.  In case that all workers possess
the same skills, it will hold that xh=xl.
For simplicity, we take the probability q to be equal to e.  Hence, the firm’s maximum
problem takes the form:
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where F≥0 represents a fixed cost in production.  The firm maximises profit by choosing
simultaneously the wage levels wl  and wh paid to the workers assigned to easy and hard tasks
respectively, and the level of capital K.
The solution to problem (3) generates the following set of first-order conditions:
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where y is the expected level of production, as defined by (2).  Note that the equilibrium wage
level wl depends, through y, on the equilibrium wage level wh, and viceversa.  By manipulating
the conditions (4) and (5), one obtains that:
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Condition (7) implies that (wh-wl )>(xh-xl ).  Thus, if the skilled workers’ outside opportunities are
not worse than the unskilled workers’ ones (which is, if xh>xl), the firm will pay skilled workers a
higher wage.  The model also captures the particular case when the firm hires workers of the
same quality to perform tasks of different complexity.  Then, it holds that xh=xl, and condition (7)
implies that workers assigned to harder tasks will be paid more.  Thus, even within the same firm,
workers of equal skills can be paid different wages.  This clarifies that what drives wage
dispersion here is not workers’ quality, but the fact that different tasks within a firm are
differentially sensitive to effort.
We now concentrate on the effects of n and l on the equilibrium values of wages and
capital, that is, on wh , wl , and K.  The number of tasks n can be interpreted as a measure of
complexity in production: given l, the greater the number of tasks, the greater the probability that
something goes wrong and production is lost.  On the other hand, given n, a greater number of
easy tasks l reduces the weight of hard, and riskier, tasks on the production process.
By differentiating the system (4)-(6), and exploiting the second-order conditions
associated with problem (3), one obtains the following:
 Result 1.  An increase in the number of tasks n will raise the wage paid to high-skilled workers
whenever expected revenues are increasing in n: hence, it holds that dwh/dn>0 whenever
dy/dn>0.  Similarly, it holds that dwh/dl>0 whenever dy/dl>0.
                                                                                                                                                                            
5
  By contrast, Kremer and Maskin (1996) consider workers who have intrinsically different
productivity and analyze the optimal matching decisions of the firm.
6Note also that when dwh /dn is positive, both dwl /dn and dK/dn are positive as well, since
(wh-xh)=z·(wl-xl ) and )/()( βα zrxwK hh −= .  Analogously, when dwh /dl>0, it will hold that dwl
/dl>0 and dK/dl>0.
These implications of Result 1 need some discussion, because they crucially depend on
the sign of  dy/dn and dy/dl.  What are the plausible signs for dy/dn and dy/dl?  Consider first the
case of a firm which is considering whether to implement a more complex technology (higher n).
The technology will be adopted only when profitable, that is, only when the condition dΑ/dn>0
holds.  By the envelope theorem, it holds that dΑ/dn=dy/dn-wh*.  Consequently, it must be true
that dy/dn>0.  We can conclude that increasingly complex technologies will only be implemented
when revenues y are increasing in n: this can occur for example when more sophisticated
products sell at higher prices.  Thus, as implied by Result 1, the adoption of more complex
technologies is bound to raise wages.
We can now discuss the effect of a change in l.  Given the degree of complexity in the
technology considered (i.e., given n), a rise in l implies that some “hard” tasks can be transformed
into “easy”, less risky tasks.  This occurs, for example, when certain tasks requiring a high level
of skills can be reduced into “routines” performed by less paid workers6.  On balance, the net
effect of changes in l on y is intrinsically ambiguous.  On the one hand, a greater number of easy
tasks, given n, reduces the risk and increases revenues’ expected value.  On the other hand, it is
reasonable to expect that the condition Bl<0 holds: products that rely on very standardized
production methods are likely to sell at lower prices.
As shown in Section 2.3, more precise predictions on the effects of n and l on wage-
levels can be obtained by considering competition among firms.
2.2. Choice of monitoring.
The model developed in the preceding section can be extended to the case when the firm
disciplines its workers not only by setting the wage level, but also by choosing the level of
monitoring.  Higher monitoring intensity facilitates the detection of workers’ ill-performance.
Two considerations make monitoring relevant.  First, monitoring and, more in general,
“supervision” has a relevant role in the organization of production (see, among others, Bulow and
Summers (1986)).  Second, there remains the theoretical possibility that, when the degree of
technological complexity increases, firms react by increasing their monitoring intensity instead of
                                                          
6
  See the example of the printing industry reported in Mark (1987).  See also Bresnahan (1999)
on white-collar tasks.
7raising wages.  We assume that the firm can choose to monitor a worker assigned to a certain task
with intensity m.  The cost of m is given by M(m), with M’>0 and M’’≥0.  Since higher
monitoring intensity will induce each worker to exert more effort, we can modify the effort
function (1) as follows:
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where s=(h,l) denotes the worker’s type and σ ∈(0,1).
The maximum problem now takes the following form:
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By calculating and re-arranging the first-order conditions of problem (9), one obtains:
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Note that, if the degree of convexity of the function M(m) is strong, the firm will rely mainly on
the wage to induce workers to perform adequately.  When the cost of monitoring is linear, that is,
when µ⋅= mmM )( , condition (10) implies that any change that affects the wage-premium (ws-
xs) will vary the choice of monitoring intensity ms in the same proportion:
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8The higher the marginal cost of monitoring, µ, the higher is the wage relative to monitoring
intensity.  Also, when the ability to monitor is rather limited, the employer will pay higher wages.
In conclusion, monitoring does not generally eliminate the need to pay high wages when
complex technologies are adopted.  For this reason, we will abstract from monitoring in the rest
of the theoretical model.
2.3. The effects of competition.
Result 1 holds for a given number of firms, f.  In this section we consider product-market
competition through the entry of new firms, in order to obtain sharper predictions from firm-level
comparative statics.  To this purpose, we impose that the zero-profit condition holds.  This
condition takes the form 7:
FKrlnwlwy hl +⋅+−⋅+⋅= )( (12)
Exploiting condition (12) together with equations (4)-(6), one obtains the following
system of three equations in (wl ,wh ,K):
[ ] 0)()( =−−+⋅+−⋅+⋅ llhl xwFKrlnwlwβ (13)
[ ] 0)()( =−−+⋅+−⋅+⋅⋅ hhhl xwFKrlnwlwz β (14)
[ ] 0)( =⋅−+⋅+−⋅+⋅ KrFKrlnwlw hlα (15)
By totally differentiating the system (13)-(15) with respect to (wh, wl, K, n, l, F), we
obtain the following result 8:
Result 2. Under the zero-profit equilibrium, it holds that: (i) dwh/dn, dwl /dn, and dK/dn
are positive, (ii) dwh /dl, dwl /dl, and dK/dl are negative, and (iii) dwh /dF, dwl  /dF, and dK/dF are
positive.
                                                          
7
  The zero-profit condition determines f*, the equilibrium number of firms operating in the
market.
8
  The determinant associated to the system (13)-(15) is negative.  The proof of Result 2 is rather
immediate, although it requires tedious calculations.
9Result 2 has some relevant implications.  First, when a firm adopts a relatively complex
technology (i.e., when n is high in our model), it will be ready to pay relatively high wages to its
employees, be them attached to hard or easy tasks.  Higher complexity raises the risk of failure in
production.  Thus, since tasks are complementary, the employer will have an incentive to elicit
more effort from every employee.  In this perspective, wage inequality tends to arise mainly
through “plant segregation”:  there are high-wage plants and low-wage plants according to the
type of technology adopted.9  Many contributions on wages have identified increasing
sophistication in technology with the diffusion of computers, and microprocessor technology in
general, on the workplace: see Krueger (1993), Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), Berman,
Bound, and Machin (1998), Dunne, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Troske (2000), among many others.
In particular, Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998, p.1168), and Bresnahan (1999) have argued that
computers seem to be better suited to eliminate easy tasks, rather than complex and idiosyncratic
tasks 10.  In their cross-section analyses on wages, Dunne and Schmitz (1995) and Doms, Dunne
and Troske (1997) have used the number of new factory automation technologies to proxy for
production process complexity.  Van Reenen (1996), and Machin and Van Reenen (1998), among
others11, have elected R&D expenditure as a measure of technological sophistication.  Even from
our perspective, these measures remain useful to proxy for complexity.  However, consistently
with the O-Ring approach, we will also need some technological variable to account for the
degree of inter-dependence among tasks.
Result 2 has a second important implication for the firm’s wage policy, which is related
to the proportion between hard and easy tasks.  Firms that experiment a decrease in the proportion
of easier tasks, as measured by a reduction in l for given level of n, will pay their workers more,
be them attached to hard or easy tasks.  An increase in ratio between hard tasks and easy tasks is
what Johnson (1997, p.48) has termed “extensive technological change”:  our model predicts that
this type of technical change will lead the employer to pay higher wages to all the employees.
Intuitively, an increase in the proportion of hard tasks leads to higher risk of production failure
for any given level of effort put in by workers.  Consequently, the employer has an incentive to
pay higher wages to elicit more effort.
Result 2 has also a third implication.  Firms that bear high fixed costs, as measured by F,
tend to safeguard their investment by paying high wages, so as to obtain a better performance
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  For evidence on plant-segregation, see Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) and, in particular, Kremer
and Maskin (1996).
10
  On this issue, see also Johnson (1997).
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from their workers.  Fixed costs can capture different kinds of sunk investment, such as
irreversible equipment, or R&D itself.  Moreover, the amount of fixed costs is likely to be related
to the firm’s size, measured by number of times the basic production process is replicated.
The idea that employer’s characteristics, such as the features of technology, drive the
firm’s wage-policy has been widely discussed.  As argued by Krueger and Summers (1987,1988),
technological factors seem to be very relevant to explain wage structures over different countries.
Moreover, Katz (1986) and Gibbons and Katz (1992) have noted that inter-industry wage
“relativities” are remarkably similar in different occupations.  On the basis of Katz’s evidence,
Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991, p.167) have concluded that “this is not at all consistent with
a technological approach.  Why should the responsibilities of office workers, janitors, technicians,
and operatives in different industries all vary in proportion? It seems most unlikely.”12  However,
the objection raised by Layard et al. (1991) is not valid when technology is represented by an O-
Ring production function.  In the O-Ring perspective, production succeeds when a number of
inter-dependent operations are performed correctly.  Consequently, ill-performance by an
electrician in the production of airplanes can have more dramatic consequences that his sloppy
performance in the car industry.
The use of the O-Ring production function is consistent with alternative wage theories.
According to the efficiency-wage approach we follow, complicated technologies induce firms to
pay high wages, so as to improve performance.  By contrast, the competitive approach followed
by Kremer and Maskin (1996) predicts that firms adopting complex technologies will hire high-
skill, high-wage workers.  Hence, increasingly complex technologies may lead to skill-
segregation among plants 13.  Note however that, if skills were the only relevant factor and
monitoring problems were irrelevant, the presence of incentive schemes would be difficult to
explain.
Another implication of the model is related to the wage gap between workers performing
hard tasks and workers performing easy tasks.  The following result holds:14
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  See also Berman et al. (1994).
12
  A similar point is made in Gibbons and Katz (1992).
13
 The model in Kremer and Maskin (1996) is consistent with explanations based on “skill-biased
technical change” and, more in general, with the idea of skill-technology complementarity:  see
Goldin and Katz (1998).
14
  To verify Result 3, note that d(wh – wl)/dn=z (dwh/dn).
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Result 3. An increase in n, or a decrease in l, will raise the wage differential between wh
and wl.
This Result has interesting implications for the wage policy followed within a firm, and
in particular for what concerns within-firm inequality.  Increasing within-firm wage inequality
has been observed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) in US manufacturing plants, and by
Kramarz, Lollivier and Pelè (1996) for France.  According to Entorf, Gollac, and Kramarz
(1999), this phenomenon is accounted for – at least in part – by the introduction of new
technologies.
To summarize, the simple model presented may account for two types of wage
inequality:
(i) Within-Group wage inequality.  Our model can explain why identical workers can be
paid different wages in equilibrium.  Suppose that all workers possess homogeneous
skills.  According to Result 2, firms that adopt complex technologies will pay their
workers higher wages than firms that use simple technologies (within-group, between-
plant inequality).  Furthermore, Result 3 predicts that identical workers can be paid
different wages by the same employer depending on the task they are assigned to (within-
group, within-firm inequality).
The stylised assumption that all workers possess the same skills is patently extreme, but it
neatly shows the peculiar implications of our model with respect to others.  Our model can fully
account for within-group wage dispersion, since it depends on employer’s effects related to
technology.  By contrast, competitive models treat residual variation merely as unobserved
ability.
At the same time, it is quite reasonable to suppose that hard tasks are likely to be given to
high-quality workers.  Under this presumption, our results can explain wage inequality among
heterogeneous workers:
(ii) Between-Group wage inequality.  Firms that adopt riskier technologies – as measured by
a higher n, or a lower l – will exhibit greater wage dispersion (see Result 3).
Consequently, the more complex the technology, the greater the level of wage inequality
among high-skill and low-skill employees.
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3. Empirical analysis
The theoretical implications of the model are tested in what follows.  Section 3.1 presents the
empirical strategy. Section 3.2 describes the data we use. Finally, Section 3.3 presents and
discusses the empirical findings.
3.1. An empirical model
The theoretical model set out in section 2 has important empirical implications.  Both the level
and the distribution of wages in the firm are related to the complexity of the production process.
Result 2 implies that the wages of all categories of workers should be positively affected by the
relative proportion of complex tasks in production.  Result 3 predicts that the variability of wages
at the firm level should be an increasing function of the relative proportion of complex task.
Let x denote a vector of controls for wages and uj , j=1, 2, 3, denote a stochastic
disturbance.  We can write the following empirical relationships:
),,/( 11 ulnfw x= (16)
),,/( 22 ulnfws x= s = h, l (17)
),,/( 332 ulnfw x=σ (18)
Equation (16) says that the average wage in the firm ( w ) is a stochastic function of the ratio of
complex tasks, n/l, and of a vector of control variables, x.  According to Result 2, the average
wage is an increasing function of the task ratio:  0)/(/ >∂∂ lnw .  Equation (17) says that, ceteris
paribus, the wage of every category of workers is an increasing function of the task ratio:
0)/(/ >∂∂ lnws , s=h, l.  Both equations (16) and (17) are implied by Result 2.  Equation (18)
says that, after controlling for the other factors affecting wages, the variance of wages at the firm
level, 2wσ , is an increasing function of the complexity of production as proxied by the task ratio:
.0)/(/2 >∂∂ lnwσ   Equation (18) is implied by Result 3, which says that the wage differential
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between high- and low-complexity jobs is an increasing function of the ratio of high- to low-
complexity tasks in the firm.
Apart from the variables that capture the role of complexity or process integration,
equations (16)-(18) should include the following main categories of regressors:   technological
variables and labour/union variables.  The technological variables can capture the productivity
differences across firms that are not related to the task ratio.  The labour and union variables
could capture both the firm's ability to monitor its employees and the relative bargaining power of
workers in wage setting.  In addition, we can include industry dummies to control for all the other
differences across industries for which we do not have explicit information.
3.2. The data
The data set consists of a sample of 284 UK establishments from the 1990 Workplace Industrial
Relations Survey (WIRS).  This data set is particularly attractive since it contains information on
a number of technological and union variables at the establishment level.  In addition, WIRS
provides information on financial variables and on product market characteristics.  We limit our
sample to establishments operating in the trading sector:  governmental organisations and non-
trading public corporations are therefore excluded from our analysis.
The data we use in our analysis are summarised in Table 1.  The dependent variables are
the median wages of unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled, clerical and supervisor employees.  We also
construct the average hourly wage as the weighted average of the above wages by category of
workers.  Our measure of wage dispersion is the sum of the proportions of employees earning less
than half the average wage or more than twice the average wage in the establishment.
The main variable measuring the complexity in production is the task ratio, defined as the
proportion of middle/senior managers and senior technical/professionals on total employment.
This can be seen as capturing the proportion of hard tasks over total tasks.  The theory predicts a
positive effect on all wages, including the wages paid by the firm to the workers who perform
easy tasks.
Another critical variable is the presence of integrated process controls (IPC).  This is
defined as the microelectronic control of integrated processes, where the control involves several
stages of production processes.  This variable measures the intensity of the interdependency
across tasks.  A higher degree of integration exacerbates the consequences on total production of
mistakes in a single task.  The effect on wages should be positive for all categories of workers.
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We also include two variables related to computer usage:  the presence of minicomputers
and the existence of a computer network.  The first variable can be seen as mainly capturing the
complexity of tasks in the establishment, and the second variable as mainly capturing the degree
of interdependency across tasks.  Both variables measure the use of advanced technology and
complementarity among production tasks.  The proportion of total expenditure of the organisation
spent on R&D can also be seen as a measure of the complexity of tasks in production.
Among the technological variables, we include measures of relative productivity.  These
measures consist of a comparison of labour productivity in the establishment with other similar
workplaces.  Another important technological variable is the size of the establishment, which we
measure by total employment.  The size of the establishment is also important for:  (1) the ability
of the firm to monitor its employees:  the bigger the size, the more difficult it is to monitor
workers (the expected sign on wages is therefore positive);  (2) a measure of fixed costs:  larger
firms tend to be associated with larger fixed costs (the model again predicts a positive effect).
Among the labour variables, union effects are measured by the proportion of unionised
employees on total employment.  This variable can influence the outcome of bargaining over the
wage above the efficiency wage level (which would then place a lower boundary on the range of
wages).  We expect a positive sign.  We also consider the existence of performance appraisal
systems, i.e. individually written assessments produced periodically by managers or supervisors.
Appraisal systems are likely to be associated with higher monitoring ability.  It is therefore
possible to elicit a given level of effort with a lower level of wages.  The sign predicted by the
theory is therefore negative.  An additional labour control is turnover:  a higher turnover could
lead to higher efficiency wages being paid.
We include one-digit industry dummies in our regressions to capture any inter-industry
source of differences in wages.  Our regressions therefore capture the intra-industry structure of
wage levels.  Additional controls in our empirical regressions were measures of output demand
elasticity, product characteristics, foreign ownership, market structure indicators, entry barriers,
financial performance, joint consultative committees, capacity utilisation, and usage of special
tools and machinery.
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3.3. Empirical findings
Table 2 presents regressions of  the average hourly wage.  Column (1) includes establishment size
(SIZE), the unionisation rate (UNION), the existence of appraisal systems (APPRAISAL), the task
ratio (TASK RATIO), the presence of integrated process controls (IPC), and the interaction
between the task ratio and integrated process control.  All variables are significant and have the
expected sign.  Size, which may capture both the ability to monitor and fixed costs, has a positive
effect on the average wage, as expected.  The unionisation rate has a positive effect on the
average wage.  The ability to monitor measured by the existence of an appraisal system reduces
the average wage by about 11%.  The most important variable for us is the presence of integrated
process controls.  Their marginal effect is positive and estimated at 0.09 at the sample average.
On average, thus, the presence of integrated process controls increases the average wage by about
9%.
Column (2) also includes expenditure on R&D, both on its own and interacted with the
task ratio.  The marginal contribution of R&D is positive when estimated at sample average, but
not statistically significant.  The coefficients on the other variables are not affected by the
inclusion of R&D.
Column (3) and (4) include additional controls:  these are whether the productivity in the
establishment is higher or lower when compared with similar workplaces, and the turnover ratio.
The productivity variables have the correct sign, but they are not statistically significant, both
without and with R&D.  A higher turnover is associated with a lower average wage, but again the
regressor is not statistically significant.
We have also included a number of alternative regressors, but they are not statistically
significant.  In particular, in contrast to other empirical studies (Krueger, 1993;  Autor, Katz and
Krueger, 1998;  DiNardo and Pischke, 1997) which find that computer use has a positive
influence on wages, we find that various measures of the adoption of computing facilities have no
significant effect on the level of wages, once we control for integrated processes.
Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997), Dunne, Foster, Haltiwanger and Troske (2000) use
measures of technological advancement at plant level (such as CAM/CAD) and find a positive
association with wages.  Among the alternative measures of microelectronics applications that we
use (such as design, control of individual machines, control of individual items of processed
plants, centralised machine control of groups of machines, IPC, automatic handling of products
and materials, etc.), by far the most important one is IPC.  We also find that the use of alternative
types of tools and machinery have no significant effects on wages.
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We should note that we cannot control for the ability or skill of workers, but industry
dummies can partly capture the sorting of skills among production sectors (Bartel and Sicherman,
1999).
Table 3 presents the estimates corresponding to column (2) of Table 2 for the median
wages of individual categories of workers:  unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled, clerical and
supervisors.  The task ratio, integrated process control and their interaction remain significant for
all groups of workers.  An important result is that the estimated coefficients for the task ratio tend
to increase with the degree of worker specialisation.  The unionisation rate and the appraisal
system are both quantitatively more important and more statistically significant for manual
workers (unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled).  A possible explanation for the latter finding is that
the ability to monitor through the appraisal system decreases with the relative complexity of the
task.  R&D tends to be quantitatively more important for clerical and supervisors, although it is
not statistically significant.
Table 4 presents regressions on the wage dispersion at establishment level (within-firm
wage dispersion).  The dependent variable is the sum of the proportion of employees whose wage
is greater than twice the average wage in the establishment, or less than half the average wage.
The dependent variable is therefore a measure of the variability of the distribution of wages in the
establishment.  Column (1) shows that size has a negative influence on wage dispersion.
Combining this result with tables 2 and 3, we can infer that, on average, larger firms pay higher
wages and display lower within-firm wage variability.  Unionisation has a negative influence on
wages, consistent with what we would expect on the role of union.  Following our theoretical
discussion in section 2, the microelectronics variables we consider are the use of minicomputers,
the existence of a computer network, and the task ratio.  Minicomputers have a positive effect,
consistent with greater complexity.  The presence of a computer network has a positive effect,
consistent with enhanced interdependency across tasks.  The task ratio has a positive influence, as
we would expect from the theory, although its effect is not statistically significant.
Columns (2) and (3) present parsimonious representations of column (1).  The effects of
the variables are confirmed when we only include minicomputers or the existence of a computer
network.
To summarise the results in Table 4, although our data do not confirm a direct effect of
microelectronics on the level of wages (unlike, for instance, Krueger, 1993, and Entorf, Gollac
and Kramarz, 1999), we do find that the presence of a computer network or the use of mini-
computers tends to increase the within-firm dispersion of wages.  Both a computer network and a
mini-computer can be seen as associated with a greater degree of inter-dependency among the
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tasks carried out by individual workers.  Our findings are therefore consistent with the view that
the within-firm wage differential increases with the relative complexity of tasks in the firm.
4. Concluding remarks
This paper looks at the relationship between technological complexity and wages.  Using a panel
of UK establishments, we find that wages increase with the degree of complexity, measured both
by the task ratio and by the presence of integrated process controls.  This is true both for the
average wage in the establishment, and for the wage of each category of workers.  Our findings
are consistent with Kremer's (1993) "O-Ring" production function, which assumes strong
complementarities among the production activities.  We also find that the ability to implement
performance appraisal systems has a negative and significant effect on wages, consistent with the
efficiency wage hypothesis.  The use of minicomputers or the existence of a computer network
increases the within-firm wage dispersion, consistent with the presence of complementarities in
the production process.
We do not have information on individual workers' quality at the firm level, and cannot
therefore rule out that more complex tasks are associated with higher wages because of their
complementarity with skills (Goldin and Katz, 1996, 1998).  Our findings however show that the
task ratio exerts a positive influence on the wages of all categories of workers, and are therefore
consistent with the existence of strong complementarities among tasks, as suggested by the "O-
Ring" technology.
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List of variables
The expressions in brackets denote the WIRS (1990) code.
Total employment;  number of employees by category.  (C1).
Median pay.  (K12).
Hours per week.  (K13).
Paid overtime hours.  (K14).
Proportion of full-time employees earning half the average gross earnings or less.  (K15).
Proportion of full-time employees earning twice the average gross earnings or more.  (K16).
Number of employees who resigned during the last twelve months.  (P1).
Presence of integrated process control.  (A26_07).
Mini-computers use.  (A27_03).
Presence of a computer network.  (A27_05).
Proportion of organisation's total current expenditure spent on research and development.  (FB13).
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Table 1.   Descriptive statistics
mean standard
deviation
median 25% percentile 75% percentile
Log average
hourly wage
1.4387 0.3424 1.4788 1.3001 1.6337
Log average
hourly wage,
unskilled
1.2403 0.3499 1.2909 1.0878 1.4424
Log average
hourly wage,
semi-skilled
1.3888 0.3329 1.4307 1.2648 1.5784
Log average
hourly wage,
skilled
1.5774 0.3403 1.5988 1.4397 1.7636
Log average
hourly wage,
clerical
1.3858 0.3753 1.4171 1.2809 1.5523
Log average
hourly wage,
supervisor
1.6986 0.3948 1.7504 1.5506 1.9185
Wage
dispersion
16.0166 21.6360 2 6 17
Number of
employees
995.8 1086.1 680.0 295.0 1329.5
Union
recognition
0.6292 0.3487 0.7578 0.3656 0.9237
Performance
appraisal
system
0.3415 0.4751 0 0 1
Task ratio 0.1107 0.0960 0.0800 0.0489 0.1340
Integrated
process control
0.3415 0.4751 0 0 1
Mini-
computers
0.7739 0.4191 1 1 1
Computer
network
0.6678 0.4718 0 1 1
Research and
development
0.9401 3.0434 0 0 0
High
productivity
0.1585 0.3658 0 0 0
Low
productivity
0.0845 0.2786 0 0 0
Turnover 0.1096 0.1532 0.0627 0.0250 0.1268
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Table 2.   Process integration and average wage.
Dependent
variable:  log
average hourly
wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SIZE 0.0000319**
(0.000015)
0.0000284*
(0.0000149)
0.0000489**
(0.0000165)
0.0000431**
(0.000016)
UNION 0.1580383**
(0.0662283)
0.1679017**
(0.0663437)
0.1412997**
(0.060107)
0.1567733**
(0.059357)
APPRAISAL -0.1103196**
(0.05121)
-0.1000636**
(0.0514322)
-0.0628487
(0.042037)
-0.051811
(0.042557)
TASK RATIO 0.8425846**
(0.217261)
1.030174**
(0.262627)
0.6320191**
(0.196729)
0.8303971**
(0.242461)
IPC 0.2151123**
(0.073513)
0.2021293**
(0.069097)
0.1728162**
(0.067289)
0.1596943**
(0.062451)
TASK RATIO
*IPC
-1.00562**
(0.47769)
-0.971915**
(0.4006979)
-0.9316319*
(0.49545)
-0.8836626**
(0.402477)
R&D

0.0236804
(0.019477)

0.0205348
(0.01938)
TASK RATIO
*R&D

-0.15345
(0.114127)

-0.1433107
(0.113673)
HIGH PROD
 
0.0120027
(0.048266)
0.0062748
(0.0486694)
LOW PROD
 
-0.05602
(0.071753)
-0.060321
(0.075306)
TURNOVER
 
-0.1544502
(0.183456)
-0.140041
(0.184975)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 284 284 270 270
F1 5.35** 4.07** 3.30** 2.77**
F2 4.76** 4.73** 4.62** 4.64**
R2 0.1987 0.2116 0.2169 0.2317
se 0.3138 0.31243 0.28863 0.28702
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity-consistent s.e. in brackets.
*:  statistically significant at 10% level;  **:  statistically significant at 5% level.
F1:  joint significance of explanatory variables.
F2:  joint significance of industry dummies.
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Table 3.    Process integration and wages by category of workers.
Dependent
variable:  log
average hourly
wage
Unskilled Semi-skilled Skilled Clerical Supervisors
SIZE 0.000045**
(0.000016)
0.0000237
(0.0000146)
0.0000224
(0.0000153)
0.0000445**
(0.000017)
0.0000304*
(0.000017)
UNION 0.175254**
(0.070732)
0.1968196**
(0.06957)
0.1905938**
(0.06636)
0.0738355
(0.075706)
0.1158761
(0.083462)
APPRAISAL -0.1232139**
(0.050332)
-0.117116**
(0.049117)
-0.092907*
(0.050324)
-0.0292428
(0.054534)
-0.0602387
(0.05435)
TASK RATIO 0.6279454**
(0.26427)
0.7563357**
(0.267502)
0.9561889**
(0.28588)
0.9219136**
(0.280989)
1.03209**
(0.312482)
IPC 0.1791657**
(0.074794)
0.247069**
(0.061919)
0.2281434**
(0.065869)
0.1912421**
(0.074501)
0.2408877**
(0.076483)
TASK RATIO
*IPC
-0.8040623*
(0.412708)
-1.129559**
(0.403450)
-1.074697**
(0.411807)
-1.103659**
(0.428232)
-1.08822**
(0.4698)
R&D 0.0056168
(0.020000)
0.0161337
(0.021374)
0.0088467
(0.02067)
0.021795
(0.021902)
0.0203728
(0.020942)
TASK RATIO
*R&D
-0.0630803
(0.108268)
-0.1105014
(0.116641)
-0.1162685
(0.120641)
-0.1590408
(0.121301)
-0.1355007
(0.113962)
Industry
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 284 284 284 284 284
F1 4.85** 5.41** 4.92** 3.11** 2.98**
F2 5.23** 3.78** 2.36** 4.50** 4.92**
R2 0.1979 0.2071 0.1638 0.1648 0.1667
se 0.32206 0.30458 0.31974 0.35248 0.37033
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity-consistent s.e. in brackets.
*:  statistically significant at 10% level;  **:  statistically significant at 5% level.
F1:  joint significance of explanatory variables.
F2:  joint significance of industry dummies.
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Table 4.    Wage dispersion.
Dependent variable:
Wage dispersion
(1) (2) (3)
SIZE -0.00360**
(0.00110)
-0.00291**
(0.00108)
-0.00327**
(0.00108)
UNION -12.728**
(5.035)
-13.430**
(5.071)
-13.162**
(4.957)
TASK RATIO 48.167
(39.217)
33.203
(22.545)
34.273
(35.029)
MINICOMPUTERS 6.078*
(3.693)
8.196**
(3.422)

TASK RATIO *
MINICOMPUTERS
-24.506
(24.481)
-29.437
(24.694)

NETWORK 8.556*
(4.706)

9.864**
(4.393)
TASK RATIO *
NETWORK
-25.477
(37.043)

-30.743
(36.343)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
n 240 240 240
F1 5.28** 5.48** 5.66**
F2 2.27* 2.03 2.19*
R2 0.1788 0.1628 0.1729
se 20.248 20.354 20.231
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity-consistent s.e. in brackets.
*:  statistically significant at 10% level;  **:  statistically significant at 5% level.
F1:  joint significance of explanatory variables.
F2:  joint significance of industry dummies.
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